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The Carthaginians, writes Plutarch, are ‘bitter, grim, subservient to rulers 
and arrogant to subordinates, at their worst in moments of fear, at their 
most savage in moments of anger. Once they have made a decision, they 
persevere in it. No amusement, no charm softens their severity. [Had a 
Cleon or Alcibiades treated them humorously], they would have put both of 
them to death for frivolously insulting them.’ These censorious 
generalisations about a people 250 years dead give an idea of how the 
Greeks and Romans viewed the greatest state in the pre-Roman western 
Mediterranean. The impression is still widespread today, partly thanks to 
Gustave Flaubert’s Salammbô (1862) with its deliberately exotic Carthaginian 
world of oriental luxury, barbarity and amorality. Hannibal did his country’s 
memory no good, either, by invading Italy with non-classical resources – 
African elephants and Numidian cavalry – and winning battles by tricks and 
ambushes, censured by Livy as Punicae artes.1 
In reality, the Carthaginians were part of the Greek and Roman 
world from early on, steadily assimilating more and more from it and 
contributing much in return. The city was founded, traditionally, in 814 or 
813 BC by political refugees from Tyre in Phoenicia, led by their queen 
Dido; and archaeological finds dating to the mid-eight century BC suggest 
that the tradition was not too far wrong. The Phoenicians had already 
sprinkled Mediterranean shores with small but significant settlements, like 
Utica near Carthage and Gades (Cádiz) in Spain. Next came Carthage: Qart-
Hadasht, the ‘new town’. Its auspicious site, across the narrowest stretch of 
the Mediterranean from Sicily and at a crossroads of east-west and north-
south trade – including the Atlantic Ocean – and its sage trading practices 
made the new town wealthier and more powerful than all the rest put 
together.2 
                                                 
1 Plutarch, Praecepta gerendae rei publicae 3.6 (=Moralia 799), translated by D. Russell, Plutarch. 
Selected essays and dialogues (Oxford and New York 1993) 142-143. Plutarch contrasts the 
Carthaginians with the more gentlemanly Athenians of, again, the distant past. Punicae artes: 
cf. Livy 21.34.1, 25.39.1. Flaubert’s Salammbô (based on Polybius and Flaubert’s own visit to 
Carthage) tells the story of the savage revolt of the city’s mercenaries against her after the 
First Punic War.  
2 On Carthage’s foundation date, see e.g. S. Lancel, Carthage (Paris 1992) 32-37; and in V. 
Krings ed., La Civilisation phénicienne et punique. Manuel de recherche (Leiden, New York, Köln 





In the fifth century BC the Carthaginians extended their control over 
neighbouring regions: partly by annexation to enlarge the city’s own 
territory as far as the Cape Bon peninsula, partly by forming hegemonial 
alliances with other coastal Phoenician cities like Utica, Hippacra (Bizerte) 
and even Lepcis, far to the east near modern Tripoli. Furthermore they 
imposed their rule on the native Libyan communities inland (Libya being 
the name for the lands around the great river Bagradas, the modern 
Mejerda). By Hannibal’s boyhood, around 240 BC, Punic rule extended up 
to 200 kilometres inland, ending only at the eastern high plateaux of the 
nomadic and warlike Numidian peoples and, to the south, along the desert’s 
edge. The Libyans did not always put up gladly with this rule, but Carthage 
weathered every rebellious storm – even the mighty uprising called the 
Truceless War, of 241 to 237, when her unpaid foreign mercenaries and 
Libyan conscripts raised most of Libya against her and it required a supreme 
effort, led by Hannibal’s father Hamilcar, nicknamed Barca, to defeat them.  
 
 
Expansion beyond Africa 
 
Along with Carthaginian expansion within North Africa came expansion 
beyond. As well as Phoenician colonies dotting the Mediterranean coasts of 
Africa and Spain, others had been founded at good trading sites in western 
Sicily and in Sardinia. In the seventh century the Carthaginians themselves 
founded one on the island of Ebusus (Ibiza). In Sicily, notable Phoenician 
centres were Panormus (Palermo), Soluntum nearby, and Motya on a small 
offshore island – Mozia, now a rich archaeological site – just north of 
today’s Marsala. Of the settlements in Sardinia the most important were 
Tharros on the south-western coast and Carales (Cagliari) on the southern 
coast. Punic rule, as in Libya, confined itself to taxes, military levies and 
(perhaps) adjudicating serious disputes. Strongpoints were held by garrisons, 
locally levied or else mercenary, or both; but the cities, towns and other 
communities remained locally self-governing. Again as in Libya, 
                                                                                                             
Mitteilungen des Deustchen Archäologischen Instituts (Rom) 96 (1989) 155-194. Development of the 
city to 600 BC: Lancel, Carthage, chapter II. 




Carthaginians might go to live among them and, no doubt, people from 
such places sojourned or settled at Carthage in their turn.3  
Strikingly, the Punic overseas ‘empire’ – not an empire in the sense of 
direct rule – covered not only limited ground (excluding most of Sicily and 
much of the Sardinian interior, for instance) but limited populations: largely 
fellow-Phoenician settlements and their hinterlands, but even so not the 
settlements in Spain, which at best counted as friendly allies until the later 
third century. The populations in most Punic-dominated towns, trading 
centres as they were, must have been quite mixed, but the local ruling elites 
were of Phoenician descent, and the Phoenician language, or its daughter 
Punic, was dominant. Rather than ruling territories directly, then, Carthage 
outside Africa – indeed, outside Libya – exerted hegemony over relatives 
(and any native subjects that they ruled). Her dealings with the rest of the 
Mediterranean world were quite different. 
Sicily, outside its Punic-dominated western quarter and parts of the 
island’s interior, was heavily settled by Greek colonists from the mid-eight 
century on. Several of their foundations grew powerful and famous: above 
all Syracuse and, close to the south-west coast, Acragas (Agrigentum to the 
Romans, Girgenti today). The development of Greek Sicily in population 
and economy can only have benefited Carthage and her ‘empire’, thanks to 
trade; so too did the advance of urbanisation, culture and Greek settlement 
in Italy. There, the Etruscan cities traded with Carthage and had strong 
navies to defend their interests. To their south, Rome and the other cities of 
Latium were vigorous from early on – by 500, Rome was one of the largest 
cities in the Mediterranean and she too carried on wide-ranging commerce 
around its lands, including with Carthage again. Greek colonisation, from 
the eight century to the fifth, studded Italy’s Tyrrhenian and Ionian coasts 
with more cities of renown and wealth: among them Naples, Rhegium 
(Reggio), Croton (Crotone), Tarentum (Taranto), and the notorious if short-
lived Sybaris near Croton, replaced later by the more decorous Thurii.4 
 
                                                 
3 On Carthage’s overseas dependencies, see e.g. W. Huss, Geschichte der Karthager (München 
1985) 57-74, 467-474. Carthaginian settlers were periodically sent out into Libya, according 
to Aristotle (Politics 2.11.15; 6.5.9). 
4 Growth of Rome down to 500: T.J. Cornell, ‘Rome and Latium to 390 BC’ in: F.W. 
Walbank e.a. ed., The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. 7.2 (second edition; Cambridge 1989) 
242-308, there 242-257. At about 426 hectares, Rome ca. 500 BC was smaller only than 






Carthage: Italy, the Etruscans and Greece 
 
Relations between Carthage and Italy around 500 BC are vividly illustrated 
by two documents. The first, discovered at Pyrgi, the port of Etruscan 
Caere, in 1964, is a gold tablet dating to around 500 BC, with a dedication 
engraved in Punic to the Phoenician goddess Astarte by the ruler of Caere; 
two other tablets repeat the dedication in Etruscan. The Greek historian 
Polybius (200–118 BC) preserves the second in Greek translated from 
archaic Latin: the text of a trade-treaty between Carthage and Rome made, 
he claims, in the first year of the new Roman republic, 509 BC. Strikingly, it 
permitted Roman trade at Carthage and in Sardinia and Sicily, but barred 
them from more distant African coasts, while it bound the Carthaginians to 
quite other provisos: not to harm Latin coastal cities allied to Rome, and to 
hand over any other place they captured to Rome. Both texts – dedication 
and treaty – reveal the close and constant relations between non-Greek Italy 
and Carthage. The treaty with Rome plainly shows, too, who had the 
stronger voice in maritime affairs.5 
With the Etruscans, Carthage was particularly co-operative for quite 
some time. Punicum, the name of another port on Caere’s coast, indicates it 
was a trading post, while in 535 BC the two sides’ war-fleets joined forces to 
defeat and expel Greeks from the east who had fled Persian rule and set 
themselves up in a new colony. This was Alalia (later Aleria) on the east 
coast of Corsica, and it provoked both Punic and Etruscan annoyance. 
Dealings with the Romans, meanwhile, involved no such trials. In 348 on 
the best estimate, another treaty superseded the first. This barred Sardinia, 
and even Libya outside Carthage itself, to Roman traders, and barred them 
too from southern Spanish coasts (so it seems) as well as African ones. It 
regulated what both Carthaginians and Romans must do if they took a city – 
or a citizen – not subject to the other state: hand the city over (but keep the 
enslaved population and booty), release the seized citizen if a Roman or, 
respectively, a Carthaginian should intervene. These provisos might all be 
viewed as implying constant mutual suspicion; but in fact no Italian city is 
                                                 
5 Pyrgi tablets: T.J. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome (London and New York 1995) 212-214, 
232; D.W.R. Ridgeway, Oxford Classical Dictionary (third edition; Oxford 1996) 1282, with 
further references. First Roman-Punic treaty: Polybius 3.22; F.W. Walbank, A Historical 
Commentary on Polybius, Vol. 1 (Oxford 1957) 339-345; Huss, Geschichte der Karthager, 87-92; 
H.H. Scullard, ‘Carthage and Rome’ in: Cambridge Ancient History Vol. 7.2, 486-569, there 520-
526; B. Scardigli, I Trattati Romano-Cartaginesi (Pisa 1991) 47-87; W. Ameling, Karthago. Studien 
zu Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft (München 1993) 141-154. 




recorded as captured by the Carthaginians in these centuries, or even 
attacked, while the archaeological evidence of Roman pottery jars reveals 
that the Romans enjoyed plenty of vigorous trade in the permitted areas, 
especially at Carthage itself, as well as in those outside Punic sway like the 
eastern coasts of Spain. But the treaty reveals continuing Punic maritime 
superiority and a firm resolve – how effectively enforced is debated – to 
restrict lands under Carthage’s hegemony to trading with Carthage and, 
presumably, her own allies and subjects.6 
With the Greek world, Punic relations were strikingly two-sided. 
Carthage got on well with old Greece and with the great Hellenistic powers 
from Alexander’s time on. In 406 BC, at the very time that she was making 
bitter war on the Greeks of Sicily, an inscription records a friendly alliance 
with Athens (herself bitterly at war with Sparta). And despite a shared 
border with Egypt – admittedly one very distant, near Cyrene – there was 
never any friction between the Punic republic and the Ptolemaic kingdom. 
That Carthage was a republic, at any rate from around the sixth century on, 
with elected leaders and an elite effectively but fluidly oligarchic, caused 
Aristotle to include tantalisingly concise comments on its political structures 
in his Politics, around 336 – the only non-Greek state thus described in the 
work.  
Matters were very different in relations with the western Greeks: a 
notable example of nearness not warming the heart. Whereas over long 
centuries much of the Mediterranean world, including Greece and Asia, 
knew the Carthaginians as sophisticated merchants, Greek Sicily in 






                                                 
6 Battle of Alalia: Herodotus 1.166-7. Second Roman-Punic treaty: Scullard, ‘Carthage and 
Rome’, 526-530; Huss, Geschichte der Karthager, 149-155; Scardigli, I Trattati Romano-Cartaginesi, 
89-127. Evidence of Roman pottery: C.G. Starr, The Beginnings of Imperial Rome. Rome in the 
Mid-Republic (Ann Arbor 1981) 33-34, 49, 62; Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 388-389. 
Ameling Karthago, 130-134, sees both treaties as revealing that the Carthaginians practised 
piracy as well as trade; cf. G.-C. Picard and C. Picard, The Life and Death of Carthage (London 
and New York 1968) 189. 
7 Alliance with Athens in 406: H. Bengtson, Die Staatsverträge des Altertums, Vol. 2 (München 





Carthaginian military ventures 
 
Carthage had become strong enough to venture militarily overseas by the 
sixth century. The first efforts are sketchily recorded: successful campaigns 
in Sicily but defeat in Sardinia, probably not long after 600. Some decades 
later a general named Mago won more wars in Sicily and used his prestige to 
establish himself and his descendants as de facto rulers of Carthage for 150 
years, manipulating her republican institutions to maintain power, rather in 
the way Hannibal’s family later did. These Sicilian wars may well have been, 
at least partly, a reaction to repeated efforts by Greeks (including, around 
510, a prince from Sparta) to expand settlement into the island’s far west. 
The Phoenician cities’ hostility to these efforts buttressed, and may have 
brought about, Carthage’s hegemony over them. Once imposed, it endured. 
It also worsened relations with the leading Greek cities, Acragas – 
uncomfortably close to the Punic dominion – and Syracuse. 
What ensued were two and a half centuries of intermittent, and 
sometimes bitter, wars. The first great clash, in 480 under the Magonid 
leader Hamilcar, was shortlived and ended in disaster at the hands of 
Syracuse and Acragas. It was followed by seventy years of coexistence – an 
example that might usefully have been imitated in later times – but a new 
series of Sicilian wars opened in 410 under another Magonid, Hamilcar’s 
grandson Hannibal, and ended only in 367. Syracuse remained Carthage’s 
chief antagonist: it was now the island’s most powerful Greek city, ruled 
from 405 to 367 by the dictator – in Greek, ‘tyrant’ –Dionysius I, who 
imposed Syracusan hegemony over most of the other city-states.8 
More wars followed after 350: against the Sicilian Greek alliance 
under their general Timoleon of Corinth in the 340s; from 311 to 306 a war 
with another Syracusan tyrant and later king, Agathocles – who took the 
boldly unexpected step of invading Libya in 310 and causing much damage 
there for several years – and then, from the 280s on, fresh conflicts with 
Syracuse and other states, who this time brought over the adventurer-king 
Pyrrhus of Epirus from Italy (where he was making no headway in a war 
with Rome) as their champion. The compromise peace that followed his 
frustrated departure in 275 lasted only until, almost out of the blue, the 
Romans themselves – Carthage’s ancient treaty- and trade-partners –went to 
war with her in 264. 
                                                 
8 Early relations between Carthage and the western Greeks: V. Krings, Carthage et les Grecs c. 
580–480 av. J.-C. (Leiden, Boston, Köln 1998). 




Carthage’s Sicilian wars were on a large scale, although our Greek sources 
are clearly inclined to exaggerate the size of Carthage’s forces. Hamilcar in 
480 probably did not command 300,000 men as Herodotus avers (Histories 
7.165), but later figures look less wildly overstated: for instance 50-60,000 
horse and foot in 345, and supposedly 70,000 foot and 10,000 horse, 
including the ‘Sacred Band’, an elite division of Carthaginian citizen troops, 
four years later at the disaster of the river Crimisus. All these armies 
marched accompanied by large numbers of war-chariots. Greek armies 
rarely matched the Carthaginians’ in size, though Dionysius I supposedly 
had 80,000 for the campaign of 397 (Diodorus, 14.47.7). Both sides 
developed advanced siege-engines for attacking each other’s cities, a 
technology with a long if destructive future. Yet, for all their violence and 
repetitiousness, these wars, lasting over two centuries, invariably ended with 
both sides in more or less the same positions. The river Halycus (Plátani) 
west of Acragas regularly remained the frontier, while both sides regrouped 





It was a notorious feature of Carthaginian armies that, as early as 480 when 
we first have details, they included large numbers of variegated levies and 
mercenaries. Hamilcar the Magonid commanded not only Carthaginian 
citizen troops but Libyans, Spaniards, Sardinians and Corsicans: contingents 
evidently recruited from Carthage’s areas of influence. As Punic wealth and 
power grew, so did the ambit of recruitment, with the army that faced 
Timoleon, for instance, also including Ligurians from northern Italy, 
Spaniards and Gauls. Troops were even hired from Italy at times, though 
never Romans (except deserters). Carthaginian citizen troops became fewer, 
except for senior officers and when emergencies within Libya called for 
mass recruitment. This happened, for instance, to confront the invading 
Syracusan army of Agathocles in 310; in 241 after the First Punic War, 
when Carthage’s unpaid mercenaries and Libyan conscripts mutinied and 
impelled much of oppressed Libya to rebel; and a century later when the 
city underwent its last doomed test, deserted by all, against the invading 
Romans. Otherwise, citizens served in some numbers in the republic’s naval 
forces. 
By the third century there were other important foreign contingents 





who softened up an enemy before engaging, came from the Balearic Islands. 
Professional Greek mercenaries – plentiful after Alexander the Great’s time, 
and the best infantry in the Mediterranean world apart from Roman 
legionaries – were often hired, though not (it seems) in Hannibal’s day. 
They were of course expensive. Elephants, apparently of the African 
species, began to be used from around 280 on (whereas war-chariots 
disappeared). Most important of all, especially in armies like Hannibal’s, 
were the Numidian cavalry squadrons, professionals again and outclassing 
virtually every other belligerent’s mounted arm.9 
This kaleidoscope of military units from all round the Mediterranean, 
most varying quite considerably from one another in weaponry, armour, 
combat methods, and indeed languages, was held together by Carthaginian 
senior officers and – wherever possible – charismatic leadership at the top. 
Their widely-varying origins again illustrate how far-flung the Carthaginians’ 
contacts were across the Mediterranean. Their rule did not extend over 
every land represented in their armies, but Punic recruiting-agents were 
always active and Punic pay and terms of service were clearly attractive 
across the western Mediterranean, and eastward too into the Greek world.  
Variegated though they were, Punic armies were formidable foes. 
They usually carried the day against ‘barbarian’ opponents, in Africa, the 
islands and Spain. Against Greek forces, and then Roman, the record was 
more fluctuating, for those enemies were as militarily advanced as Carthage 
herself and often more cohesive in equipment and methods. To win major 
victories Carthage needed generals of unusual quality and (whenever 
possible) an over-confident opponent–as happened, most memorably, in 
the Second Punic War, at least until the Romans gradually got Hannibal’s 
measure. 
One paradoxical aspect of Carthage’s war-history over so many 
centuries is rarely noted. Her traditional reputation is as the ‘queen of the 
western Mediterranean’, with a reported capacity of up to 220 capital 
warships (quinqueremes, or ‘five-oarers’, in the third century) along with 
formidable naval expertise. In practice this expertise was seldom called on. 
                                                 
9 Punic armies: C. Nicolet, in Rome et la conquête du monde méditerranéen (Paris 1977-1978) 2: 
Genèse d’un empire, 600-2; T. Wise, Armies of the Carthaginian Wars 265-146 BC (London 1982; 
reprint 1999) 4-23; Huss, Geschichte der Karthager, chapter XXXII; Ameling, Karthago, chapters 
VII–VIII. Greek mercenaries: M. Trundle, Greek Mercenaries from the Late Archaic Period to 
Alexander (London and New York 2004); G.T. Griffith, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World 
(Oxford 1935). Elephants in Punic armies: H.H. Scullard, The Elephant in the Greek and Roman 
World (London 1974) chapter VI. 




Until the wars with Rome, Punic fleets’ chief activity was to convoy ship-
transports delivering land armies and supplies (elephants included) to 
overseas theatres like Sicily, Sardinia and Spain. Even against Rome, only 
the first war frequently involved powerful fleets. In Hannibal’s war, naval 
fights were few and Carthage’s naval performance surprisingly dismal; while 
the Third Punic War was fought in Libya and outside Carthage herself by 
land forces again.10  
The Carthaginians’ principal military exertions, from the sixth century 
on, were on land, using the types of armies discussed above. This perhaps 
helps to explain how the fleets of the ‘queen of the west’ could be 
repeatedly defeated by those launched by an upstart in major maritime war, 
Rome; and why in Hannibal’s war her naval forces were almost unforgivably 
inept. Her greatest dynasty of leaders – Hamilcar Barca and his three sons, 
including Hannibal the eldest – were generals who, it can be argued, 
undervalued the role of warfare at sea while they concentrated on big armies 
and wide territorial annexations. 
 
 
Mercantile and social links 
 
But despite centuries of intermittent wars with overseas powers great and 
small, the Carthaginians also interacted peaceably and productively with the 
rest of the Mediterranean. The most vivid evidence is their mercantile, 
social and even marital links with their Greek and Roman enemies. Not 
only the treaties with Rome and the finds of Roman ware illustrate 
mercantile links: Italian traders were soon busy again with Punic and Libyan 
customers after the First Punic War, and Carthage had a number of Italian 
residents when the Third erupted. Perhaps a decade after the Second Punic 
War the playwright Plautus cheerfully put on a comedy, Poenulus (‘the 
Carthaginian fellow’), about an elderly merchant, Hanno, seeking his long-
lost daughters and characterised as a wholly inoffensive and rather 
sympathetic, if comically foreign, figure. As for social ties, the Magonid 
Hamilcar, who terrorised Sicily in 480, had a Syracusan mother, according 
                                                 
10 Carthaginian naval strength: cf. Appian, Libyca 96.452-5; cf. H. Hurst, ‘The war harbour of 
Carthage’, in: Atti del I Congresso internaz. di Studi Fenici e Punici (Roma 1983) 2. 603-10; S. 
Medas, La Marineria cartaginese (Sassari 2000) 118-121. For the navies in the first two Punic 
Wars, the classic studies remain those of J.H. Thiel, Studies on the History of Roman Sea-Power in 
Republican Times (Amsterdam 1946) and A History of Roman Sea-Power before the Second Punic War 





to Herodotus, while one of his sons, Gisco, when sent into exile settled at 
Selinus, a Greek city not far from Panormus. Two of the great Hannibal’s 
ablest operatives in Sicily from 214 to 210, Hippocrates and Epicydes, were 
grandsons of a Syracusan exiled at Carthage; and in Italy one of his trusted 
lieutenants, Carthalo, enjoyed a hereditary guest-friendship (hospitium) with 
no less a family than that of Carthage’s dogged opponent, Fabius Maximus 
the Delayer – though a Roman soldier ignored it to slay the unfortunate 
officer in the capture of Tarentum in 209. Other Carthaginian and Roman 
aristocrats had similar connexions, promptly renewed as soon as the war 
ended. It is not surprising that when Hannibal captured a Roman notable, 
one Cincius Alimentus, he seems to have treated him almost as a guest: 






Contacts between Carthage and the rest of the Mediterranean led to cultural 
interchanges, religious ones included. The cult of Astarte at Caere in Etruria 
has been mentioned. In 396 the Carthaginians, in turn, adopted a Greek 
cult: to atone for their recent destruction of temples and shrines in Sicily – 
and the ensuing plague and famine that struck the city – they solemnly 
instituted the worship of Demeter and her daughter Core (Persephone), 
deities important among Sicilian Greeks. The oath which Hannibal and his 
counsellors (and army) took in 215, when forming an alliance with the 
kingdom of Macedon against Rome, survives in its Greek version in 
Polybius: it lists a long series of Punic divinities by their Greek equivalents, 
beginning with ‘Zeus and Hera and Apollo’. Identifications are debated, but 
the first two may well be Ba’al Hammon and Tanit, the prime deities of 
Carthage, while ‘Hercules’, later in the list, is generally seen as the city-god 
Melqart. What is striking is how such Punic-Greek equivalents are treated as 
normal. 
Other Greek influences arrived. The ‘quartier Hannibal’ at Carthage, a 
hillside district inland from the sea which was developed for shops and 
                                                 
11 Italian traders and residents: Polybius 1.83.7-10; Appian, Libyca 92.434. Magonid 
Hamilcar’s mother: Herodotus 7.166. Hippocrates and Epicydes: Polybius 7.2.3; Livy 24.6.2. 
Carthalo and Fabius: Livy 27.16.5. Other aristocrats’ links: Livy 33.45.6 (in 195). Cincius: 
Livy 21.38.3-5. 




housing around the time that Hannibal was chief magistrate (sufete) in 196, is 
laid out in Greek urban style: parallel crisscrossing streets and multi-storey 
buildings with ground-floor shops, mosaics, peristyle gardens, and 
apartments equipped with comfortable bathrooms. Up to two centuries 
earlier, similar living amenities were already in use at a little coastal town – 
name unknown – at modern Kerkouane, on the Cape Bon peninsula facing 
Sicily, which was destroyed during the third century (probably by the 
Roman invasion army in 256) and never reoccupied.12 
Punic coinage was a relatively late development, later in fact than that 
of the Sicilian-Phoenician towns Panormus and Motya, which started their 
issues in the late fifth century. Carthage’s coinage originally was minted to 
pay troops in her Sicilian territories (it bore legends like s‘mmhnt: ‘the folk of 
the camp’) and was struck on Greek models like the tetradrachm. Greek 
styles continued to influence even coins minted from time to time (the 
datings are debated) at Carthage itself. Surviving specimens, for instance 
depicting a divine profile on the obverse and a horse or horse’s head on the 
reverse, are often of fine artistic quality.13 
It was natural that Greek itself should become known and used by 
Carthaginians. A story that around 370, in pique against their inveterate foe 
Syracuse, the authorities tried to ban the language, illustrates its currency. 
Later on, Hannibal was taught Greek by one Sosylus of Sparta. Sosylus and 
a Sicilian Greek, Silenus, then accompanied the general through most of his 
adventurous career, and afterwards both wrote influential accounts of him. 
Hannibal himself wrote works in Greek: both the famous lost inscriptional 
account of his wars down to 205, set up in Greek and Punic in the temple 
of Hera at Cape Lacinium (Capo Colonna) in southern Italy where Polybius 
consulted it; and years later an account, not likely to have been admiring, of 
a Roman general’s looting expedition in 187 in Asia Minor. The Greek text 
                                                 
12 Adoption of Demeter and Core: Diodorus 13.77.4-5. Oath of Hannibal: Polybius 7.9.1-3. 
Its god-list: F.W. Walbank, A Historical Comment on Polybius, Vol. 2 (Oxford 1967) 42- 52; 
M.L. Barré, The God-List in the Treaty between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon (Baltimore and 
London 1983); W. Huss, ‘Hannibal und die Religion’ in: C. Bonnet e.a. ed., Studia Phoenicia 4: 
Religio Phoenicia (Namur 1986) 223-238 (Huss sees the first two as Ba’al Eshmun and Astarte). 
13 Punic coinage, down to 264: G.K. Jenkins and R.B. Lewis, Carthaginian Gold and Electrum 
Coins (London 1963) 1-39; P. Visonà, in: Krings, La Civilisation phénicienne et punique, 167-173, 
with Plate 13, nos. 3-4, 9; L.I. Manfredi, ‘Carthaginian policy through coins’ in: G. Pisano ed., 









Carthaginian contributions to the Mediterranean world 
 
Carthage, in turn, contributed significantly, if indirectly, to Greek 
philosophy. Around 162 BC a young intellectual, Hasdrubal, migrated to 
Athens, took the name Cleitomachus, and not only became a distinguished 
philosopher but eventually, in 127, head of the Academy. Interestingly, 
along with philosophical works he wrote a consolation (not extant) to his 
fellow-citizens after the destruction of their city in 146: we may wonder 
who, among the surviving and enslaved Carthaginians, got to read it. 
Carthage passed on other things to the Mediterranean world. Her 
adaptation of a Greek style of simple floor-decoration, broken pieces of 
pottery or marble set into cement (pavimentum Punicum), spread widely, even 
to Rome. The carefully tended prosperity of the Punic hinterland, much 
admired by Greeks and Romans, led the Roman Senate after the city’s 
destruction to order the 28-book encyclopaedia of agronomy by Mago, a 
celebrated writer of perhaps the fourth century, to be translated into Latin. 
It has not survived but, as fulsome citations by Roman authors like the 
agronomist Columella and encyclopaedist Pliny the Elder show, Mago was 
revered for centuries as ‘the father of rural lore’, in Columella’s words.15 
Of course it was not only with Greece and Rome that the 
Carthaginians had fruitful relations. Egypt influenced their art and perhaps 
religion in the early centuries. In turn, the Numidian peoples to their west 
came under Punic influence, though never under their rule. Carthaginian 
aristocrats intermarried with Numidian princely families: the most famous 
                                                 
14 Alleged ban on Greek at Carthage: Justin 20.5.12-13. Sosylus and Silenus: Nepos, Hannibal 
13.3. On these friends see D. Hoyos, Hannibal’s Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western 
Mediterranean, 247-183 BC (London and New York 2003) 213, 249 n.16, 277-278 n.1, 282 n.4. 
Hannibal’s res gestae at Cape Lacinium: Polybius 3.33.18, 56.4; Livy 28.46.16. Account of 
Manlius Vulso’s expedition: Nepos, Hann. 13.2 (mentioning that Hannibal wrote other Greek 
works too). 
15 Hasdrubal-Cleitomachus: K.-H. Stanzel in: H. Cancik and H. Schneider eds, Der Neue 
Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Altertum 6 (Stuttgart 1999) 572. Pavimentum Punicum: G. and C. Charles-
Picard, Daily Life at Carthage at the Time of Hannibal (Engl. tr.: London 1961) 51; H.G. 
Niemayer in Neue Pauly 9 (2000) 453. Carthage’s prosperous hinterland: Diodorus 20.8.3-4; 
Appian, Libyca 69.312. Mago: Columella, De Agricultura 1.1.13, ‘rusticationis parentem’; Pliny, 
Natural History 18.22-3; Krings, La Civilisation phénicienne et punique, 36. 




example is Sophoniba (known to moderns as Sophonisba), daughter of one 
of Hannibal’s leading political allies, and married first to Syphax, the king 
who unified all Numidia around 205. After his overthrow in 203, she 
became wife to his victorious rival Masinissa, only to be forced to suicide to 
escape the vengeance of Masinissa’s patron Scipio Africanus. Hamilcar 
Barca, too, wedded daughters to Numidian royalty – kinsmen of Masinissa, 
it seems. Masinissa, to develop Numidia as a major regional power, used 
Carthaginian models – and frequent annexations of Carthaginian territory. 
Punic was Numidia’s second language, as inscriptions show, long after the 





In 237 Hamilcar opened a new expansionist era for his city in southern 
Spain. He and his successors as chief generals of the state – first his son-in-
law Hasdrubal and then his eldest son Hannibal – were very much in the 
mainstream of Hellenistic norms of leadership and imperialism. Their 
power rested on successful and well-publicised militarism and conquest, and 
the exploitation of Spanish mineral and agricultural wealth. Hamilcar and 
Hasdrubal founded more than one new city in Spain, a trait much in vogue 
in the Hellenistic east. The most memorable was Hasdrubal’s Qart-Hadasht, 
which the Romans called New Carthage and is still called Cartagena, a 
splendid creation with a magnificent palace on one of its hills. Hasdrubal 
also took a Spanish wife (perhaps Hamilcar’s daughter had died), and so did 
Hannibal – in his case a lady from Castulo, a wealthy town north of 
Córdoba. As with Numidian marriages, these unions aimed to confirm the 
links between Carthaginian leaders and the elites among their neighbours.17 
The Punic Wars were the somewhat paradoxical culmination of 
Carthage’s expanding interaction with the Mediterranean. Paradoxical, first 
because it does not seem that either Carthaginians or Romans intended to 
                                                 
16 On the extraordinary Masinissa, who reigned from 202 to 148, see E. Storm, Masinissa: 
Numidien im Aufbruch (Stuttgart 2004). 
17 Egyptian influences: Charles-Picard, Daily life, 37, 39, 41-42, 51, 131-132, 141-142, 157; 
Lancel, Carthage, 82-91; M.H. Fantar, Carthage: La Cité punique (Paris 1995) 30, 32, 93. On the 
Barcid era and these leaders’ achievements (and failures) see, for instance, Huss, Geschichte der 
Karthager, chapters XXIV-XXVIII; J. Seibert, Hannibal (Darmstadt 1993); S. Lancel, Hannibal 






clash, in 264 or even in 218; and second, because Carthage attained the 
historical zenith of power and success during them, only to be brought to 
defeat and then, in the third war, to genocidal destruction.18 The First Punic 
War of 264-241 made the Carthaginians fight not only on land – including 
on their own territory against Regulus in 256-255, as well as in Sicily – but 
simultaneously at sea, a military dualism never previously forced on them 
for so long a period, and so intensively. Despite losing the war, Carthage’s 
resilience was soon vividly revealed. She renewed and increased her strength 
and prosperity after the ensuing mass revolt of her mercenaries and Libyans 
in the ‘Truceless War’. Hamilcar Barca and his successors built a land 
empire across the Mediterranean in Spain, while continuing their influence 
over Numidia and while Carthaginian trade flourished, not least with Italy. 
Paradoxically again, this huge increase in terrestrial might was inversely 
matched by the near-disappearance of her traditional sea power. Carthage 
had armies tens of thousands strong (in 218 she mobilised up to 122,000 
men), but when the Second Punic War opened she could float only a 
poorly-equipped navy less than half the size of Rome’s: 87 ships to 220. 
Though it was built up again, her triumphs in Hannibal’s War were entirely 
thanks to his genius as an army commander. 
These triumphs were – temporarily – awe-inspiring enough. For 
almost a decade, after Cannae in mid-216 to mid-207 when Hasdrubal, 
Hannibal’s brother, lost his army and life invading Italy from the north, 
Carthage dominated the western Mediterranean from southern Italy to 
Spain’s Atlantic coast. Most of southern Italy abandoned its obedience to 
Rome in favour of alliance with her; already most of north Italy’s Gauls had 
done so. Macedon and then Syracuse in their turn became Punic allies. 
Punic fleets, now rebuilt, ranged as far afield as western Greek waters, for 
the first and only time in history. The Romans were hemmed in on almost 
every side. They held the heartland of Italy, an expeditionary bridgehead in 
northern and eastern Spain (almost lost in 211), and some of Sicily; little 
else. After Cannae, they did look doomed. 
 
                                                 
18 On the much-debated issue of why the first two Punic wars occurred, see W.V. Harris, 
War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 BC (Oxford 1979) 63-64, 113-114, 182-190, 
200-205, 269-270; K.-H. Schwarte, Der Ausbruch des Zweiten Punischen Krieges – Rechtsfrage und 
Überlieferung (Wiesbaden 1983); J. Rich, ‘The origins of the Second Punic War’ in: T. Cornell, 
B. Rankov and P. Sabin eds, The Second Punic War: a Reappraisal (London 1996) 1-37; B.D. 
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Had Carthage turned these extraordinary successes into lasting victory, the 
future of the Mediterranean would surely have been very different, possibly 
even until the present. After the war, Rome with astounding speed imposed 
hegemony over the entire eastern Mediterranean, ultimately to replace it 
with actual imperial rule. A victorious Carthage might well have spread 
Punic hegemony eastwards, and with all the more assurance thanks to her 
own Phoenician ties combined with her significantly Hellenised culture. At 
the same time Punic mastery of Spain and the islands, and influence over 
Numidia, would have been confirmed. Carthage would have been a power 
even greater than Rome was when, between 200 and 188, the latter 
confronted and shattered the great Hellenistic kingdoms east of the 
Adriatic. And Hannibal would still have been Carthage’s leader. 
Instead, the aftermath of the Second Punic War reduced her to 
virtual satellite status vis-à-vis Rome. Yet prosperity again returned, partly 
perhaps (paradox again) because she was forbidden to have a navy or, 
effectively, much of an army, and thus could use her resources elsewhere; 
partly, too, thanks to Hannibal’s financial and political reforms as sufete in 
196, hitting at corruption and promoting more open government. Even if 
the city’s wealth was less, on the archaeological evidence, than in the great 
days of the Barcids, it was imposing enough to attract the repeated 
depredations of Masinissa and, by the late 150s, the censorious and alarmist 
eye of the Roman leader Cato. Between the two of them, the Carthaginians 
were harassed and provoked into desperate actions at the end of the 150s, 
thus giving the again suspicious Romans a pretext for making an end of 
their old rival in the Third Punic War of 149–146.19 
Even then Carthaginian culture, and Carthage itself, refused to die. 
The other Phoenician colonies, the towns and countryside of Libya, and (as 
mentioned earlier) Numidia maintained much the same culture as well as 
the language. When a new, Roman, Carthage was founded by Julius Caesar 
a century after old Carthage’s destruction, the city quickly regained pre-
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eminence as the wealthiest and most advanced in North Africa, after 
Alexandria. The new Carthage, and Roman Africa, would go on to play 
leading roles in the history, civilisation and religions of the Roman Empire. 
For instance, one of the imperial dynasties founded by Septimius Severus 
(emperor AD 193-211), was of Punic as well as Italian descent.20 Thus was 
renewed the interaction with the rest of the Mediterranean world which the 
first Carthage and her people had so fruitfully practised for nearly a 
thousand years. 
 
                                                 
20 Severus and his dynasty: A. Birley, Septimius Severus: the African Emperor (second edition; 
London 1988); P. Southern, The Roman Empire from Severus to Constantine (London and New 
York 2001) 23-63; B. Campbell, ‘The Severan dynasty’ in: A. Bowman e.a. ed., The Cambridge 
Ancient History, Vol. 12-2 (Cambridge 2005) chapter I. 
